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Abstract
Broker-less content-based publish/subscribe systems offer the chance for flexible
and loosely coupled many-to-many communication. Initially, no centralized com-
ponent is needed. Routing is done by the peers themselves by looking at the con-
tent of the messages. This works fine, as long as no sensitive data is published. In
this case, users may want to encrypt their data and even keep their subscriptions
confidential.
At first glance, this contradicts the content-based routing paradigm. The work
of Tariq et al.[28] presented the first system, that supports both by introducing a
weaker notion of subscription confidentiality. Identity-based encryption is adapted
to suite the requirements in such a system.
This thesis will analyze the approach, point out some still existing problems and
try to improve them. The current system uses one-hop flooding during event dis-
semination, which yields a high number of false positives. Simulations will show,
that confidentiality can be kept nearly as high with much less false positives. An-
other issue is private keymanagement as the number of keys to maintain is in order
of O(Sdi=1 log2 Ti) with d attributes in total and Ti =
UpperValueLimiti LowerValueLimiti
Granularity(i) ,
where Granularity(i) determines the finest step value of attribute Ai. As the num-
ber of total attributes in a real system may be much greater then the attributes
needed by an event, there are two problems: 1) how to specify the attributes that
are not required by the event and 2) the cost of cryptographic operations is depen-
dent on the total number of attributes.
In the second part of the thesis we will provide another approach that decouples
events and subscriptions from the total number of attributes. Timings, based on
an implementation using the Pairing-Based Cryptography library (PBC)[10] will
be given.
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1 Introduction
The established client-server model is well suited for many applications, where
one known server is in contact with only one user per session. Even if this simple
scenario is extended to 1-to-m communication, still sender and receiver need to
know each other. Many modern applications require m-to-n communication, e.g.
to allow users to interact with each other. If all of the messages need to be sent
over a server, the system may be not scalable. Moreover, client-server interaction
is initiated by the client. This is not suitable for all scenarios, as there exist many
event-driven applications, like stock quote services. Each user, who wants to be
notified as soon as a stock quote rises over a specific value would have to poll the
server individually every now and then, even if no new information is present. If
interaction could commence by the server, only onemessagewould suffice, because
it knows when to send it.
This is why publish / subscribe systems become increasingly popular. Here, com-
munication is initiated by the sender. Users can still have two roles: 1) Publishers,
who write messages (often also called events or notifications) without declaring
any special receiver and 2) subscribers, who announce their interests in the form of
filters and will receive the events. In most systems a fixed broker infrastructure, the
close match of servers, handle the part in between. It uses subscriptions to route
published events to all subscribers with matching filters. By this means, sender
and receiver are decoupled, as they have no information about each other and do
not need to be logged into the system at the same time (if brokers store the events).
Most frequently used is the most expressive content-based routing model[3, 25, 24],
that decides only on basis of the actual message content, where to forward mes-
sages. Often, these brokers are trusted, so that addressing confidentiality is quite
easy.
Recent work in the field of publish / subscribe is frequently based on the idea of
peer-to-peer, resulting in broker-less systems. The tasks of the brokers needs to be del-
egated among the peers themselves and the infrastructure has to be self-organizing.
As every peer is possibly part of the routing overlay and there cannot be any trusted
routing infrastructure, confidentiality is much harder to achieve. Not only confi-
dentiality, but also Quality of Service and clustering are discussed[26, 27, 29, 30].
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1 Introduction
1.1 Provision of security mechanisms
As the awareness of privacy and confidentiality grows steadily and it is long since
it reached the world wide web, also publish / subscribe systems are concerned.
Three types of security are important: First, authentication makes sure, that users
are allowed to send or receive messages. In some systems, users will have to pay a
fee or need to register first.
Subscription confidentiality assures, that the interests of subscribers are kept pri-
vate. In a broker-based environment, where brokers are trusted, the solution is
easy: Peers only need to tell their subscriptions to the broker and they can use this
information to match them against incoming events. Without brokers, strong sub-
scription confidentiality cannot be kept, unless broadcast is used, which yields a lot
of false positives and is not scalable for obvious reasons.
Publication confidentiality on the other hand pays attention to the events. Their
content should be kept private, so that only authorized subscribers can read them
and nobody can modify the message. Encrypting and signing would solve this
problem, but this is a contradiction to the content-based routing paradigm or the
expressiveness needs to be limited. Moreover classic end-to-end encryption needs
the two parties to share keys, no matter if symmetric or asymmetric encryption is
used. This again conflicts with the loose coupling reached by publish / subscribe.
Pietzuch (Hermes[16]), Pesonen et al.[15], Opyrchal[14] all address security in
publish / subscribe systems, but all rely on brokers. But Tariq et al. is the first to
propose a system[28], where all, authentication, subscription and publication con-
fidentiality are handled in a broker-less content-based publish / subscribe system.
A weaker notion of subscription confidentiality is introduced to ensure, that peers
cannot infer more than a containment relationship about the subscriptions. Peers
are then clustered in hierarchical ordered trees to build an event dissemination in-
frastructure. Identity-based signcryption[33], is used for authentication by encrypt-
ing and signing the messages. On the other hand, only authorized subscribers are
able to decrypt and verify the events. Indeed a key server is used for this method,
but scalability is preserved, as it only needs to setup the initial parameters and, in
contrast to public-key infrastructure (PKI) systems, store only one private key, in-
dependent of the number of users. Each users only needs to ask the key server for
its private key once per epoch. This load can be easily balanced by replicating the
key server.
Whereas this is seems a promising solution regarding confidentiality, other draw-
backs arise. As peers do not know subscriptions of other peers, one-hop flooding
is used to disseminate events to children in the trees, but not all of the children will
have a matching subscription. So a lot of false positives are generated. The second
issue is key management, as the keys to maintain for each peer is O(Sdi=1 log2 Ti)
with d attributes in total and Ti =
UpperValueLimiti LowerValueLimiti
Granularity(i) , where Granular-
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ity(i) determines the the minimal value difference of attribute Ai. In general, the
total nubmer of attributes d may be much larger than the set of relevant attributes
d’ for one event.
Unfortunately, no evaluations of the confidentiality were made so far, but this
thesis provides an analysis, using a simulationwritten in java with PeerSim[12] and
aims at finding weaknesses in the concept and provides a suggestion to improve
them.
1.2 Organisation of this thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:
 next, chapter 2 gives an overview over related work.
 Chapter 3 explains the underlying paper with techniques used and states
some of its problems.
 Chapter 4 will analyze the current approach with the help of a simulation.
Also a variation of the event dissemination protocol is discussed.
 In chapter 5 identity-based signcryption and attribute-based encryption will
be combined to create an alternative cryptographic scheme that allows the
use of an arbitrary number of advertisements and subscriptions.
 At last, chapter 6 will conclude this thesis and give some hints about future
work.
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2.1 General overview
In recent years a lot of research effort has been spent on building scalable and ex-
pressive content-based publish / subscribe systems[3, 13, 25] or confidentiality in
form of encryption and authentication[6, 21, 32, 5, 23, 9]. However the combination
security issues in broker-less systems is rarely addressed.
Another paper[8], that was released at about the same time as [28] also focused
confidentiality in publish / subscribe networks, but with brokers. Their idea is
to encrypt events with attribute-based encryption and handle subscription confi-
dentiality by sending filters encrypted to the brokers and then use mechanisms of
encrypted search on them.
[1] gives an good introduction into identity-based encryption in general, an asym-
metric cryptosystem type, that uses obvious but unique identifiers like names or
addresses as public keys. Then two systems are introduced: Cocks’ method uses
quadratic residues and the more famous approach of Boneh-Franklin, using bilin-
ear maps. More about the latter one can also be read in [11].
Based on IBE exists an interesting paper[33] about identity-based signcryption.
Here, encryption and signature are combined in one step and its security is proven
secure without using random oracles. This technique is useful, when authentica-
tion and confidentiality are both required.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first presented by Sahai and Waters[19].
Enhancements were made[18, 7] to support ciphertext-policy attribute-based en-
cryption (CP-ABE) and key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE). The in-
tention is to drop the need to encrypt with one key for a particular user, but to be
able to specify an access structure, that determines, who can read the message. In
CP-ABE the access structure is embedded in the ciphertext, meaning, the sender
can specify, who shall be able to decrypt the message. On the other hand, KP-
ABE shifts the responsibility to the receivers. The other private key is in each case
labeled with attributes, which can be matched against the access tree. [19] made
it possible to decrypt a message, as soon as a certain threshold of similarity was
exceeded. This is useful for biometric access control, as measurements are faulty.
The last two mentioned methods, ABE and signcryption, were used in the origi-
nal approach[28] as well as in this thesis to construct a cryptosystem, that is able to
encrypt and sign at the same time as well as to handle access control.
At last, I want to mention [17], that sharpens the awareness to traffic analysis, as
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not only breaking encryption, but already knowing message flows can reveal some
information. Assume a state, that can track traffic from an terrorist website back
to the users. Not all of them may be criminals, but at least suspicious. One hint
is already given by an intersection attack, that tries to map users, that are online
at the same time, if there is a bidirectional communication between them. Timing
Attacks look at the round trip times for known route lengths. We assume in this
paper, that an attacker may track messages through our network as long as it has
knowledge of the links.
2.2 p5: A protocol for scalable anonymous communication
2.2.1 Basic idea
p5[23] (Peer-to-Peer Personal Privacy Protocol) is based on a naive solution of broad-
casting in a peer-to-peer environment. If all peers participating in the system send
dummy messages with a fixed length with a fixed time between two packets, an
adversary could not gather any information by observing network traffic, as all
peers behave in the same way. The dummies, also called noise, are replaced with
chunks of the real message for communication. Each packet will be encrypted with
a public key of the receiver to protect the content. It is clear, that this method cannot
be scalable as there exists a trade-off between limiting sending rates and overhead
for noise. Receiver anonymity is granted, as the receiver could be anywhere in the
broadcast group. To provide sender anonymity a mechanism to hide the sender
address is needed. This can be achieved by implementing the broadcast as a ring.
By this means, no peer can determine if it is the first receiver of this message.
2.2.2 Reaching scalability
p5 achieves scalability by introducing a hierarchy of broadcast channelsL. L is a
complete binary tree where each node is a broadcast group, represented by a bit
string. Users are mapped to one of these groups by hashing their public key and
choosing an anonymity coefficient m. According to these two information, the user
is assigned to the group, that matches the first m bits of its hashed public key. The
smaller m, the higher up in the tree is the user placed and less anonymity can be
provided. But on the other hand, communication is more efficient.
Anonymity is based on indistinguishability from other users and thus depends
on the size of the broadcast groups and the number of groups a user could be part
of.
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2.2.3 Adapting this protocol
p5 is designed to work for one-to-one communication as a symmetric encryption is
used for message confidentiality. For the use in a publish / subscribe system there
are neither methods to keep subscriptions confidential nor to map users to a group
of receivers. This renders the approach useless for our purpose.
2.3 Information slicing: Anonymity using unreliable overlays
Information slicing[9] proposes an innovative method to provide anonymity with-
out any encryption. Any information is split into d pieces and sent along different
routes, so that no user receives more than one piece of information.
2.3.1 Premise
Information slicing assumes, that a user has access to d distinct IP addresses and
Internet access points, one of which needs to be uncompromised. The latter is de-
noted as source S, the others as pseudo-sources S’. S could be a home computer,
whereas S’ can also be in school, work or even an Internet cafe.
2.3.2 Message scrambling
Sometimes even a partial message can already reveal important information. In a
war scenario a message “Attack at dawn” can be split up into d = 2 pieces with
m1 = “Attack at” and m2 = “dawn”. If m1 would be intercepted, the enemy could
come to the conclusion, that he will be attacked, even if he does not know when.
To prevent this, the message is multiplied with a random d  d matrix A, that
needs to be invertible.
~I =
0B@ A1...
Ad
1CA ~m = A~m
The sender will then send Ii and Ai to the receiver on d distinct paths. I

i denotes
the i-th line of ~I and Ai the i-th line of matrix A respectively.
The original message can be restored by the computation of
~m = A 1~I
2.3.3 Routing
The remaining question is how to find the d distinct paths. This is done by choosing
a path length L and arranging disjoint random nodes in L stages. The receiver will
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be on any of these. For a split factor d=2 and L = 3, let’s assume path 1 with nodes
in the following order S, U1, U2, U3 and path 2 with nodes S0, L1, D, U3, where
S and S’ are the source and pseudo-source and D is the destination. To establish
the paths, the nodes will be informed about their next hops. Each node, beginning
with the sources as stage 0, will send one message to each of the d nodes in the
next stage containing the scrambled routing information of all the next hops on the
path. After each stage, a random piece of information needs to be included to keep
the message length constant.
2.3.4 Adapting this protocol
Unfortunately, there is no reasonable way to adjust this protocol to work in pub-
lish / subscribe systems as it would be great to abandon encryption, as it always
needs a lot of computation time and thus resources. But the design is not designed
for multiple receivers, as the path length would increase dramatically. Also the
need to publish information from multiple sources in parallel is infeasible for real-
time applications
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3.1 Identity-based encryption
In a large publish/subscribe system it is infeasible to maintain one public/private
key pair per user, as it is needed in Public-Key Infrastructures (PKIs). The objec-
tive of Identity-based encryption (IBE) was to minimize the need for Certification
Authorities. IBE was first introduced by Shamir[22] in 1985. Since then, it was
developed further[19, 7, 18]. The idea behind IBE is to use any uniquely identi-
fying string, like an email-address or a name as public key for each user. Most
approaches[2] use a bilinear map which is a pairing e : G1  G2 ! GT for cyclic
groups of order p with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(ga1, g
b
2) = e(g
b
1, g
a
2) = e(x, y)
ab for all g1 2 G1, g2 2 G2, and
a, b 2 Zp.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1, for all g1 2 G1, g2 2 G2.
3. Computability: e can be efficiently computed.
e is called symmetric, ifG1 = G2. For cryptographic use, p is some large prime and
the groups are often elliptic curves[11]. An alternative would be using quadratic
residues[4, 1].
As described in [1], a generic IBE scheme consists of four steps:
1. Setup: Initialize the groups, bilinear map, hash functions and other public
and private parameter
2. Extract: Return a private key for a given ID and the public parameter to the
user
3. Encrypt: Generate a ciphertext for a given message and the ID of the receiver
4. Decrypt: Uses the private key to decrypt a ciphertext and restore the original
message.
Figure 3.1 shows, how a message can be sent and received in IBE. The message
can already be encrypted, as soon as the public parameters are published, with the
receivers known identity. The receiver can then ask a key server for his private key
by authenticating. This private key can be used for any future messages.
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Figure 3.1: Scheme of identity-based encryption[1]
Note, that the key server only stores one private key. Users need their private
keys and the public parameters to be able to communicate with every other user in
the system. For this reason, IBE is suitable for the use in a large publish/subscribe
system in contrast to common PKI systems. Certificates are no longer needed, as
users are bound inherently to their identity. Instead of Certificate Authorities, a
Private-Key Generator is used for setup and key distribution.
3.2 Providing security mechanisms in broker-less
content-based publish / subscribe systems
The basis for this thesis is the work of Tariq et al.[28]. In contrast to most other
papers in this area, security and confidentiality will be achieved in a broker-less
publish/subscribe system. Roughly said, this works as follows: The event space
is divided for each attribute separately and each attribute is assigned an own tree.
Peers are added in a hierarchical manner in the trees according to their subscrip-
tions. Coarse subscriptions are near the root, finer ones lower down to the leaves.
Thus the peers know, they have a coarser or equal subscriptions then their chil-
dren. Therefore we need a weaker subscription confidentiality. As routing-strategy
each peer needs to check, if an received event matches its subscription. If so, the
event needs to be send to parent and children, else only to the parent. A combi-
nation of identity-based encryption (IBE)[7] and signcryption[33] is used to keep
events and subscriptions confidential.
I will describe this approach in detail now and then point out some issues after-
wards.
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3.2.1 System model
Content-based publish/subscribe
This approach uses the content-based publish / subscribe model without any bro-
kers. We denote W as the set of all d distinct attributes and call it event space. Each
attribute Ai has an unique name and a domain, the range of possible values, of any
ordered data type like strings or numeric values.
Subscriptions are modeled as filters, which consists of a conjunction of d predi-
cates Pi, each containing the attribute Ai, a compare operator for the data type of
Ai and a value.
Events are denoted similar to subscriptions as d tuples of attribute and value,
the difference is that exact values are given, so that they can be matched against
subscriptions. A subscription f1 is said to cover or contain another subscription f2
if f1  f2, that means f1 matches the all of the events of f2 and can match more.
Attacker model
We focus on themain part of Tariq’s work, thuswe assume, there is a secure way for
communication with the key server and key distribution. This can be for instance
any known transport layer security like SSL.
Next, we suppose that peers do not trust each other and everyone could be ma-
licious. Nevertheless authorized peers behave as intended. Publishers only send
valid events and subscribers do not share their information about other subscrip-
tions and the content of messages. Last case would be equal to solve the digital
copyright problem. In the case of malicious publishers, spam with faked events is
supposed. Malfeasant peers in general try to get more information about the sub-
scriptions of other users then the weaker subscription confidentiality allows to and
subscribers try to read events, they are not authorized to decrypt. Still, malicious
peers will stick to the protocol and forward messages as any regular user.
A passive adversary with global view completely outside the system is also con-
sidered, however there can be communication links, that it cannot observe. It will
eavesdrop on the accessible links and gather information provided by malicious
nodes, thus we assume all malicious nodes are colluding. This data is analyzed to
break our security assumptions.
During event dissemination, we expect that an attacker can distinguish multiple
events and thus can handle each notification separately. The physical address is
visible to everyone and different subscriptions on the same peer can be told apart
e.g. by a differing port. So each attribute tree will be handled individually.
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3.2.2 Event space decomposition
To be able to cluster the peers, we need to divide the event space in distinct parts, so
that containment relationships can be derived. For decomposition we introduce dz-
expressions, to identify subspaces. dz-expressions are binary strings or the symbol
e to denote the whole event space.
Numeric attributes
For numeric attributes, the range can always be bisected and labeled with ’0’ for the
lower half and ’1’ for the upper half. Assume a weather service, which publishes
information about the temperature. The initial range is e = [0, 100] (in %). The
first bisection would yield dz0 = “0” = [0, 50] and dz1 = “1” = (50, 100] the
second one dz2 = “00” = [0, 25], dz3 = “01” = (25, 50], dz4 = “10” = (50, 75] and
dz5 = “11” = (75, 100]. Thus, the number of bisections correlate with the length of
the dz-expressions and indicate the granularity. Subscriptions and advertisements
are ranges or hyperrectangles (see the case in the next paragraph), whereas events
are single points.
We use this decomposition for each attribute tree separately for effectiveness, al-
though it is possible to apply this mechanism for multiple trees at once. For that,
an event space with d attributes is seen as a d-dimensional space, where each di-
mension represents an attribute. Thus the terms “attribute” and “dimension” are
sometimes exchanged. Now the first bisection is meant for the first dimension, the
second for the next and so on. The above example is extended with another at-
tribute “humidity”, for simplicity also in the range [0, 100]. The decomposition can
be seen in figure 3.2. The example subscription f1 would yield the dz-expression
{01} and f2 would need the two expressions {000, 010}.
Using this method, containment relationships can be determined easily by com-
paring the dz-expressions. If dz0 (“0”) is a prefix of dz2 (“00”) then dz0 is coarser
than dz2, meaning dz0  dz2.
String attributes
The abovementioned techniqueworks intuitively for numeric attributes, but can be
used with any ordered data type with limited bounds. Strings could be hashed or
given a maximum length. Subsequently, prefix matching can be applied to divide
the domain. Better are tries. In a trie, nodes are always prefixes and edges are
labeled with characters. They are ordered in a manner, that each node is the prefix
of its children.
For subscriptions, any node can be chosen, whereas events are always leaves. As
tries are optimized for fast string look-up and prefix matching containment rela-
tionships and event matches can be easily calculated.
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Figure 3.2: Event space decomposition for two numeric attributes[28]
3.2.3 Credentials
Credentials need to be provided by peers to the key server for authentication. They
consist of capabilities and the proof of identity. The second part can be an arbitrary
identifying method like a password, challenge-response or hardware supported
techniques. As we are not interested in authentication techniques right now, we
will focus on the capabilities, which are given by dz-expressions.
How keys are related
Now that we know how to divide the event space into subspaces and create dz-
values, we can discuss the role of the key server, which is mainly to authorize cre-
dentials and to generate private keys.
The key server is only needed in steps 1 and 2 of the generic IBE scheme, as
described in 3.1. The first thing to do in a fresh system is to initialize parameters
and deploy the public ones among the users of the systemwhile storing the private
parameters locally.
Public keys will be a concatenation of the dz-expression, the letter ’P’ or ’S’ to
distinguish publisher and subscriber respectively and an epoch for key revocation.
This string will be the public key and can be assembled by every user without
interacting with the key server.
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Private keys are generated by the key server, if the right credentials were pro-
vided during key generation.
3.2.4 Binding subscriptions
With more than one subscription or when regarding two colluding peers, the prob-
lem arises that a malicious peer could misuse his authorized subscriptions to read
events, that are not destined for it. Assume again a weather service and two sub-
scribers. The two subscriptions are f1 = ftemperature = [10, 20] ^ humidity =
[20, 50]g and f2 = ftemperature = [20, 30] ^ humidity = [60, 70]g and the peer
has got credentials for each attribute separately. f3 = ftemperature = [10, 20] ^
humidity = [60, 70]g and f4 = ftemperature = [20, 30]^ humidity = [20, 50]g could
also be decrypted by this peer. This needs to be prevented. Therefore, keys are
bound together by the key server. When assigning keys, the key server chooses a
random value qi for each attribute and integrate it into each part of the key, so that
Sdi=0qi = q. This value is canceled out, if all of the keys of the subscriptions are used
when decrypting.
3.2.5 Security methods
The goal of this system is to create an overlay network, in which users can use pub-
lish / subscribe services for sensitive data. First, authentication is given by the in-
teraction with the key server. Only who provides correct credentials receives keys
and can either sign events or decrypt the messages, he subscribed for. Messages
will be signed to proof the authenticity. Next, confidentiality is improved compared
to other systems. Events are confidential due to encryption. Only authorized sub-
scribers are able to decrypt. Subscriptions are not given into the system, as it is
usually needed to route the events. By the use of subscription clustering and the
hierarchical overlay topology some information is leaked, but we can still apply the
weaker subscription confidentiality, which is already a good improvement. Third,
in contrast to other approaches for confidentiality, like PKI, this work is scalable
for large networks. The key server only maintains a single private key, no matter
how many users there are in the system. Publisher and subscriber need to store a
logarithmic number of keys with respect to the depth of the decomposition tree.
3.2.6 Topology and Secure Connection Protocol
We want to reach a tree topology that is ordered by containment relationships, i.
e. coarse subscriptions are near the root and finer ones are further down to the
leaves. In addition, a parent can only add another peer as a child, if the parent’s
subscription contains the subscription of the child. This means, the parent can
decrypt all of the messages, that his children can decrypt, maybe more.
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To achieve this and try to keep as much confidentiality as possible, a secure con-
nection protocol is established. The pseudocode can be seen in algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Secure connection protocol at peer sq
upon event: Receive (CR of snew from sp) do
if decrypt_request(CR) == SUCCESS then
if degree(sq == available) then
connect to snew
else
forward CR to {child peers and parent} - sp
end if
else[decrypt_request(CR) == FAIL]
if sp == parent then
Try to swap by sending its own CR to snew
else
forward CR parent
end if
end if
As a first step, a random secret word is encrypted with all public keys, that may
decrypt the own subscription. If a peer wants to subscribe to “00” for instance, it
is encrypted with the keys for “00” and “0”. To prevent any attackers to retrieve
information by looking at the number of ciphertexts, dummymessages are created.
These ciphertexts will be part of a connection request CR, which is sent to a random
peer sq in the running system.
If a CR is received, the peer will try to decrypt the ciphertexts. If it succeeds,
it tries to add the new peer as a child. If this is not possible, the CR needs to be
forwarded in both directions, up and down the tree, as all of the addressed peers
could also decrypt the CR. If the CR cannot be decrypted, the children of the peer
also won’t be able to decrypt, so the request needs to be forwarded to the parent,
except if the request was already sent from the parent p. In this case, the peers
will try to swap: the current child, say c, sends and CR to the joining peer (j). If j
can decrypt CRc, then he adds c as his child and connects to p itself (The structure
will be: p -> j -> c). In case no child can swap, the joining peer needs to be added
anyways as sibling to c. Note, that reconnecting one child could lead to an endless
loop, especially at the beginning of the algorithm, when there are not many (or
even just one possible) peer to connect to.
This procedure will be repeated for all dz-expressions and all attributes sepa-
rately. A peer with multiple subscriptions will be connected multiple times in the
same tree.
Worth mentioning is, that there are other approaches by Tariq[26, 27, 29] that fo-
cus different problems, in this case QoS requirements are specified in the subscrip-
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tions and the topology is created to fit these. [30] adapts techniques from spectral
graph theory to cluster peers in content-based publish/subscribe systems.
3.2.7 Weaker subscription confidentiality
As could be already seen in the previous sections, it is impossible to achieve strong
subscription confidentiality in this system, maybe even not in broker-less publish/-
subscribe systems at all. During the connection process and deduced from the
topology, peers know or at least can have some guesses at the subscriptions of
the other peers, especially the own parent and children. Thus, a weaker notion of
subscription confidentiality is proposed in [28]:
Let s1 and s2 denote two subscribers in a publish/subscribe system which both possesses
credentials for an attribute Ai. Weak subscription confidentiality ensures that at most the
following information can be inferred about the credentials of the subscribers:
1. The credential of s1 is either coarser or equal to the credentials of s2.
2. The credential of s1 is either finer or equal to the credentials of s2.
3. The credentials of s1 and s2 are not in any containment relationship.
3.2.8 Event dissemination
As a publisher, who wants to send an event, does not know, who subscribed to the
news he is going to give into the system, he needs to encrypt the message with ev-
ery possible public key. This means, there will be a logarithmic amount (= length
of the dz-expression) of ciphertexts for each event on each attribute tree. To re-
duce the load, the message is encrypted with a symmetric encryption algorithm
like AES and only the symmetric key is encrypted multiple times. To check later, if
the decryption was successful, a fixed length of ’0’ or the hash of the key should be
appended. In addition sequence numbers should be assigned, so that the parts of
the message from the different trees can be reassembled easily.
The initial message is sent to any random peer on each tree. A peer, that receives
an event, tries to decrypt the ciphertexts. The further dissemination is similar to the
secure connection algorithm shown in 3.1. If the decryption fails, the event is only
forwarded to the parent, unless the parent was the sender, then it is dropped. If the
decryption is successful, the peer sends the event to parent and all of his children,
again as before, except the sender of the event, so that we do not have to deal with
duplicates. Note, that not all of the children necessarily need to be able to decrypt
the message, but due to this one-hop flooding, a peer does not need to have a list of
subscriptions of his children, at the cost of false positives.
As soon as a peer received all parts of the message, he tries to decrypt the whole
event and checks its authenticity.
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3.3 Problem statement
As there most probably is no perfect system, there are some drawbacks and im-
provement suggestions for this one. I will explain them in the following section.
3.3.1 Key management
Currently, events and subscriptions respectively need to specify each of the d at-
tributes, thus the number of keys to maintain is dependent on d. This is not de-
sired, as the publish/subscribe system can support multiple independent topics.
The need to declare a stock symbol when publishing an medical topic would be
irritating and could make subscription matching difficult.
In addition the computation time for en-/decrypting, signing and verification
are also dependent on d. When developing a technique like mentioned above, it
should be asserted, that all operations only depend on the number of actually used
attributes, which will be a small subset.
Therefore we need amechanism, that allows an arbitrary number of attributes for
events and subscriptions. We need to agree on a protocol, when an event matches
a subscription.
3.3.2 Attacks by publishers
Like explained for subscribers in 3.2.4, publishers can misuse their credentials to
publish events they are not allowed to. But in contrast to subscribers, private pub-
lisher keys are not bound together.
3.3.3 Event dissemination
One-hop flooding has the advantage, that peers do not need to know the subscrip-
tions of their children by simply assuming, they have the same as the parent itself.
In worst case in 50% of the cases, the children will not be able to decrypt the event
and they will drop the message. This overhead is called false positives and should
be minimized, as it causes a lot of unnecessary traffic and computation cost at the
peers.
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Last chapter described the approach developed by Tariq et al.[28]. Now we will
analyze the threat of attacks to break the confidentiality of this system, state a for-
mula for measuring confidentiality and discuss an alternative to one-hop flooding.
Evaluations will be given afterwards.
4.1 Problems with the current approach
There are two main issues we will focus.
1. First, as described in 3.2.7, a weaker subscription confidentiality is assumed,
as a strong confidentiality probably cannot be provided. Clustering sub-
scriptions already reveals some information about containment relationships,
thus, restrictions are eased. We will simulate an attack scenario to examine
the decrease of confidentiality.
2. The second one is a performance issue. One-hop flooding renders the need
to know one children’s subscriptions unnecessary, but generates a lot of false
positives on the other hand, which are undesirable. We will introduce a tech-
nique named k-subscriptions, that allows us to drop one-hop flooding with
only a slight change in the system, so that not much confidentiality is lost,
but we reduce the false positives to a minimum.
4.1.1 Traffic analysis
Raymond[17] proposes some methods for traffic analysis. With such techniques
an attacker can gather some information. Even if we assume point-to-point en-
cryption, where the bit string of a forwarded event changes on each hop, messages
can be traced by means of timing attacks, as links usually have delays in some
estimated bounds. Just as soon as there are communication links, that the adver-
sary cannot access, it must assume different clusters. If some malicious node can
decrypt an event and communicates the topic to the attacker, it can deduce infor-
mation about other peers in the same cluster. If a peer forwards a message to its
children, the adversary knows that it must be able to decrypt the message and can
store this in a knowledge base. Subsequent notifications can improve this. The
other way round it can be determined if the message cannot be read, when it is
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dropped. Even the weaker subscription confidentiality 3.2.7 can be limited a bit.
As soon as the last explained case occurs, the attacker (or even the child itself) can
state, that the child has a coarser (and not equal!) subscription then the parent.
Similarly during the connection protocol, if a connection request is forwarded to a
parent and no children, this either means that the peer cannot take more children
or is not able to decrypt the request. But if the parent can decrypt the request, it can
discover that the child got a finer (and not equal!) subscription.
As a last example, fake events can be used to detect subscriptions, as they are
only dropped after they are successfully decrypted. When sending a fake message
to a branch, it will be forwarded upwards until some peer decrypts and drops it.
This will reveal some evidence about the peers. Repeating with different events
can even break some subscriptions completely.
4.2 Attack scenario
In this scenario the attacker is omnipresent, meaning he knows or can observe
the protocol and network parameters. Thus it knows the communication delay of
the links, can eavesdrop on them and with these information trace messages sent
through the network with all means of traffic analysis, as explained for instance by
Raymond[17]. As soon as any message is detected on a communication link, the
receiver will be targeted, to notice on which link the event is forwarded. As long
as all links are visible for the attacker, the message can be tracked during its whole
lifetime. Note, that this is also possible, if point-to-point encryption is used and the
bit sequence of the message changes on each hop. Knowing the underlying topol-
ogy and communication delays is enough to keep track. In the following, we will
assume, that not all links will be visible, as it is a reasonable assumption, because it
will be very hard for an attacker in the real world to control all of the links. In this
case, the attacker will loose track of the message, as soon as it passes a communi-
cation link, that is not observable. The attacker can only guess howmany peers the
event has passed, since it lost track as soon as it reappears but needs to assume, that
it might be a new message. In this way, the topology will be divided into clusters
in attacker’s view and each cluster needs to be handled separately.
Additionally there will be some malicious nodes, that support the adversary.
This can be peers, the attacker set up by itself or regular users, that were com-
promised. By all means, they will all collude to reveal as many information as
possible.
4.3 k-subscriptions
As already mentioned, false positives are to be avoided. To keep confidentiality
high, we propose k-subscriptions which idea is similar to k-anonymity[20].
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As a first step, we will simply include the information about the subscription of
their children in each peer. Then, an events can be forwarded only to the children,
that are interested in the message. Due to the clustering, there will be no more false
positives as soon as the notification reaches a peer, that is able to decrypt.Then we
make sure, each peer has got at least “k” subscriptions by expanding them. Recall
the technique to decompose the event space using dz-expressions. Assume, k = 3
and an initial dz-expression of {1} as subscription. In the first step, this can be
expanded to the two expressions {10, 11}. Then another expansion may result in
{10, 110, 111}. The covered event space is still the same, but there are three dz-
expressions instead of only one. Now, when the peer connects to the network, it
should be assured, that each dz-expression is connected to a different parent. To
assert, that expansion is possible, a maximum granularity needs to be declared.
4.4 One-hop flooding and k-subscriptions
The original approach uses one-hop flooding, what is intuitively a good idea, be-
cause parents do not need to know the subscriptions of their children and always
forward events that could be decrypted to them. Still it is obvious, that there will be
many false positives. Theoretical worst case value should be 50% of false positives.
Thus we will analyze the idea to drop one-hop flooding to improve performance.
4.5 Measurement of confidentiality
To compare different strategies, we will use two different formulas as both have
their right to exist. Both are calculated in the same way:
C = 100  compromised_peers malicious_nodes
total_peers malicious_nodes [in%]
They differ only in the definition of compromised peers. We denote Call as the
confidentiality where a peer is considered compromised only if all of its subscrip-
tions on all trees are revealed by the attacker. So this is an upper bound for the
values and is expected to be quiet high. In the second case, we count a peer to
the compromised, as soon as any information is leaked. Intuitively we can already
anticipate, that this definition will yield much smaller numbers. Without one-hop
flooding, the subscriptions of children of malicious nodes will always be seen as
compromised. In combination with the Cany measurement, it will be interesting to
see, how many subscriptions are exposed per peer.
In general we can state, that the following inequality will hold, because the first
definition is a special case of the second, where on each compromised peer all sub-
scriptions are discovered, and not only a part of them.
Call >= Cany
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4.6 Evaluation
In this section, we measure the confidentiality of Tariq’s work[28] and compare it
with k-subscriptions.
System specific attack details
On the one hand malicious nodes reveal their own subscription. This is why they
are excluded, when calculating confidentialities in section 4.5. As soon as we do not
use one-hop flooding anymore and the subscriptions of the children will be known
to the parent (explained in 4.4), the children’s subscriptions are also revealed. On
the other hand, they tell the adversary, whether they can decrypt events, they re-
ceived or not. If so, they will also inform the attacker about the contents. Of course,
this will only be valid in the cluster, the malicious node belongs to. Combined with
the information, if a peer forwarded a message to its children, a list can be main-
tained for each peer that records the events, which that peer can decrypt. Similarly,
a list of all events that cannot be decrypted will be kept. Aggregating multiple
entries will eventually lead to a guess of the real subscription.
As an example, we look at the graph in figure 4.1. The green arrows depict, where
the event is sent to. Here, node “100” is the publisher and sends the first message
to a random node in the network (“0”). This cannot decrypt the event “111” and
thus forwards the message only to its parent. When one-hop flooding is enabled,
the attacker can now conclude correctly, that the event was not decrypted. Later
the event reaches node “1”. As it forwards the message to its children, it needs to
be able to read the contents, but only one of its child can, the other not (red arrow).
The latter produces a false positive. If the subscriptions would be known to the
parents, this red message would not have been sent.
The algorithms, the attacker executes if an event is recognized at a specific peer
is given in figures 4.1 and 4.2 in pseudocode. They depend on the observation, if
the message is forwarded and the information, any malicious node present in the
corresponding cluster can provide. As can be seen, they do not differ much. In case
of k-subscriptions, the subscriptions of children are also revealed. As a trade-off no
information can be inferred, if the event was not forwarded to any child. Keep in
mind, that this even means an improvement in confidentiality in some cases. When
using one-hop flooding, this always means, that the event could not be decrypted.
In k-subscriptions it is also possible, that no child can decrypt the message.
Experimental setup
Wewill simulate a publish / subscribe networkwith up to 2048 peers in PeerSim[12].
If not otherwise mentioned, d = 4 attributes are used with integer values in the
range [1, 16]. The number of malicious nodes vary between 5% and 25% and
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Figure 4.1: Exemplary attack move
Algorithm 4.1 Function EvalAttack for one-hop flooding
if Peer is malicious then
Reveal subscription of this peer and children (add to corresponding posi-
tiveLists)
end if
if Event is known to attacker AND Event was forwarded to any child then
Add Event to positiveList
end if
if Event is known to attacker AND Event was NOT forwarded to any child then
if Children are present then
Add Event to negativeList
else[no children are present]
Nothing can be inferred
end if
else if Event not known to attacker AND Event was forwarded to any child then
Add all subscriptions of malicious nodes in this partition to negativeList
end if
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Algorithm 4.2 Function EvalAttack for k-subscriptions
if Peer is malicious then
Reveal subscription of this peer(add to corresponding positiveLists)
end if
if Event is known to attacker AND Event was forwarded to any child then
Add Event to positiveList
else if Event not known to attacker AND Event was forwarded to any child then
Add all subscriptions of malicious nodes in this partition to negativeList
end if
there are at least 20% and maximum all links observable. For simulations with
k-subscriptions, the variable was chosen as k = 3.
For both, subscription generation and event generation zipfian distribution is
used, as it is more realistic than uniform distribution. At first, all peers are added
and connected and in a second phase, events are generated. Attack evaluation is
called at each peer after forwarding the notification.
All results are the average of five runs.
Varying number of attributes
At first will have a look at simulation results for different number of dimensions.
We choose a hostile environment, so that Call will not be too high. There will
be 25% malicious nodes and 80% links visible while looking at d = 2 up to d = 16
dimensions.
In 4.2 we can see, that the behavior of both approaches are very similar. Here, Call
is at about 87% confidentiality, which rises up to almost 100% for eight and more
trees.
d = 4 seemed to be a good value for further simulations, as it is not too close to
100% but it is still a reasonable choice.
Fixed malicious nodes
Figure 4.3 displays the difference for an fixed value of 5% ofmalicious nodes. While
k-subscriptions even performs better for Call and when more then about 50% of
links are visible, one-hop flooding reaches about 80% confidentiality in contrast
to only 40% for k-subscriptions with 20% links visible. Why k-subscriptions can
outperform one-hop flooding in some cases was already explained in chapter 4.6.
Still, we need to look at the number of discovered subscriptions to get a real
impression. In figure 4.4 the distribution is shown for 5% malicious nodes and k
= 3, meaning, each peer has at least three subscriptions per dimension, thus more
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Figure 4.2: 25% of malicious nodes, 80% of links visible
Figure 4.3: Comparison of one-hop flooding and k-subscriptions with 5%malicious
nodes
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subscriptions altogether. This example yields an average number of subscriptions
of 13 per peer.
Figure 4.4: Discovered subscriptions per peer with k=3 subscriptions
In contrast to this, figure 4.5 depicts the same scenario with one-hop flooding.
It looks better at first glance, but there are only an average of about 8.5 subscrip-
tions per peer. This means in the first case about 50% more subscriptions need to
be compromised to extract the same amount of information. Looking at the figures
regarding this, we recognize, that in both scenarios, the most peers only got one
compromised subscription. If we look at k-subscriptions at least three subscrip-
tions need to be compromised to have the full information about one attribute. The
probability, that the first three discovered subscriptions all belong to the same at-
tribute is very low. Thus, the result is very promising.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the run of the curve for a high value of 25% of malicious
nodes. As expected, Call is still always near 100%, verifying, that it is hard to break
all of the subscriptions. Only if the number of links is also very high or even all
are observable by the attacker, confidentiality drops to about 92%, which still is
a good value for that scenario. Only Cany is really low. But we cannot expect to
keep a strong confidentiality in such an unfriendly environment. But for only a
view visible links with one-hop flooding there is a good portion of confidentiality
preserved.
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Figure 4.5: Discovered subscriptions per peer with one-hop flooding
Figure 4.6: 25% of malicious nodes
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Fixed link visibility
With 20% of visible links (4.7) one-hop flooding beats k-subscriptions easily. Still
the distribution of compromised peers in 4.8 looks fine so that k-subscriptions can-
not be ruled out.
Figure 4.7: 20% of links visible
When keeping the percentage of links visible to the attacker fixed at 40% the
results shown in 4.9 are once again in favor of one-hop flooding. The curve for
one-hop flooding is constantly about 8 to 15 percentage points higher.
Summary
The confidentiality, that can be achieved by this system is very good. Of course,
it is hard to defend privacy in hostile environments with a lot of malicious nodes
and observable links, but in most scenarios only few subscriptions per peer are
compromised. Yet, the weaker notion of subscription confidentiality cannot be met.
We have seen, that k-subscriptions is a reasonable approach and that not too
much confidentiality is lost and in some cases even gained a bit. Furthermore the
advantage is huge: Whereas one-hop flooding yields about 22-30%, in k-subscriptions
there are only an average of 2% false positives with a peak value of 5.5%. These still
occur, because the events are initially sent to a random peer. If this one is not able
to decrypt the event by chance, it will be forwarded further up the tree, until any
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Figure 4.8: Discovered subscriptions per peer with k-subscriptions
Figure 4.9: Comparison of one-hop flooding and k-subscriptions with 40%links
visible
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peer can decrypt the event. All of the nodes on this way will count the event as a
false positive. So we cannot expect to reach much better values by other methods.
Through this reduction performance should increase greatly.
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In this chapter, I will present an alternative cryptographic scheme, that is a combi-
nation of the signcryption scheme proposed in [33] and attribute-based encryption
like explained in [7] and [18].
There are two goals:
 Reduce attacks from publishers, as described in section 3.3.2. Keys need to be
bound together to prevent malicious publishers to mix their private keys to
publish events, they are not allowed to.
 Improve key management. As stated in section 3.3.1, the number of keys to
maintain for publishers as well as subscribers is dependent on the size of the
event space. The algorithm provided in this chapter will reduce the keys to
be dependent on the number of used attributes only.
In the current approach, all attributes must be specified on each subscription
and each advertisement or event. If we take a newsgroup as example the topic
variety is possibly huge. Yet, if we want to publish a news about the whether it
is meaningless, if we have to specify a stock quote. As explained in 2.1, attribute-
based encryption enables fine-grained access control. This technique will be used
to decrypt messages, where the advertisements and subscriptions are not an exact
match.
For an event with two attributes, let us say E = fa = 4 ^ b = 2g, not only exact
subscriptions like f1 = fa > 3^ b < 7g but also any subscription like f2 = fa > 3g
and S3 = fb < 7g should match. With a system like this it would not be necessary
to declare all attribute of the universe.
We will see, that efficiency is improved coherently. Timings will not be depen-
dent on the number of attributes of the universe but only of the actually used at-
tributes.
Like in most identity-based encryption schemes, we will divide this approach
into four steps: Setup, key generation, encryption and decryption. In this case,
encryption and decryption will be replaced by signcryption and unsigncryption to
include authentication.
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5.1 Setup
During the setup phase, the key server calculates and chooses the private and pub-
lic system parameters needed for further progress. Like in the other papers, bilinear
maps are used, so they need to be set up at first.
Now let G1, G2 be cyclic groups of prime order p with jG1j = jG2j = p, e be an
admissible bilinear map e : G1 G1 ! G2. g shall be a generator of G1. Next we
need two collision resistant cryptographic hash functions H1 : f0, 1g ! f0, 1gnu
and H2 : f0, 1g ! f0, 1gnm with hash length nu and nm respectively. We need two
vectors ~u and ~m of the same length nu and nm. Its elements ui and mi are random
elements from G1. Coupled to these vectors we need another random element for
each, say u’ and m’, again from G1.
Now a number a 2 Zp is chosen randomly. Then g1 = ga, ga2 and Y = e(g2, g)a
are calculated.
The Master Private Key, which is only known to the key server and should be kept
secret is ga2 . The Master Public Key consists of (e, g, g1, g2, u
0,m0,~u, ~m,Y). This key
is distributed in the system and available for every peer. It is used for encrypting
events and verifying its signature.
5.2 Key Generation
Key generation is performed, as soon as a peer contacts the key server. The peer
needs to provide its credentials and the key server decides if they are correct. As
already stated in , the credentials consist of capabilities and authentication and we
only want to care about the former one. Let Credi,j be the credential for attribute Ai
with label j with.
The public keys are generated by a simple concatenation
Pupi,j := (Credi,jjjAijjPjjEpoch)
for publishers and
Pusi,j := (Credi,jjjAijjSjjEpoch)
for subscribers. Only one flag needs to be switched and this can be done by each
peer itself. No interaction with the key server is necessary.
Private keys are more interesting to look at. For publishers, we need to choose
a random value ri,j 2 Zp, calculate r = Siri,j, the hash bit string vp = H1(Pupi,j) of
length nu, where vp[k] is the k-th bit of this string. We denote Gi,j  f1, 2, . . . , nug
as the set of all indexes k for which the k-th bit of the hash vp[k] = 1.
Prpi,j := (Pr
p
i,j[1], Pr
p
i,j[2])
with
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Prpi,j[1] = g
a
2(u
0Pk2Gi,juk)
ri,jgri,j
Prpi,j[2] = g
ri,j
Similarly, the key server chooses for the subscriber at random the values rs and
r = Sri,j. Gi,j is calculated as in the publisher’s case. Then the private keys are:
Prsi,j := (Pr
s
i,j[1], Pr
s
i,j[2])
Prsi,j[1] = g
ri,j
2 (u
0Pk2Gi,juk)
rs
and two attribute independent parts
Prsi,j[2] = g
rs
Prs[3] = ga+r2
They will be needed to make sure, all of the subscriptions are used and thus, they
are bound together.
5.3 Signcrypt
Again, choose a random q 2 Zp.
The ciphertext s will consist of multiple parts.
s1 = C1 = MYq
Note, that as in the original approach it might be more suitable to encrypt only
a symmetric key, which is used to encrypt the actual message. In the following, let
Gi,j be defined as in the previous section for key generation and Gm analogous, but
with vm = H2(M) the message hash.
s2 = C2 = gq
s3i = Ci = (u0Pk2Gi,juk)
q)
s4i = C
sign
i,j [1] := Pr
p
i,j[1](m
0Pk2Gmmk)
q)
finally
s5 = C
sign
i,j [2] := Pr
p
i,j[2]
s = (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) will be send into the network. It is still necessary to send a
logarithmic amount of ciphertexts, one for each credential, that shall able to decrypt
the message.
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5.4 Unsigncrypt
To decrypt the message, a peer needs private keys which credentials provide them
access. The following steps have to be performed:
e(Prsi,j[1], s2)
e(Prsi,j[2], s3i)
=
e(g
ri,j
2 (u
0Pk2Gi,juk)
rs , gq)
e(grs , u0Pk2Gi,juk)q)
=
e(g
ri,j
2 , g
q)e((u0Pk2Gi,juk)
rs , gq)
e(grs , u0Pk2Gi,juk)q)
= e(g2, g)ri,jq
Multiplying e(g2, g)ri,jq for each subscription results in
PSubsi=1 e(g2, g)
ri,jq = e(g2, g)rq
Now compute:
e(s2, Prs[3])
e(g2, g)rq
=
e(gq, ga+r2 )
e(g2, g)qr
=
e(g, g2)qa+qr
e(g2, g)qr
= e(g2, g)qa
Finally the message can be extracted by
s1
e(g2, g)qa
=
MYq
e(g2, g)qa
=
Me(g2, g)qa
e(g2, g)qa
= M
The message shall only be accepted, if an authorized publisher disseminated the
event. Thus, after decrypting a verification procedure follows.
Verify that
e(s4i, g)
e(g1, g2)e(u0Pk2Gi,juk, s5)e(m0Pk2Gmmk, s2)
= e(g, g)s
with
e(g, g)s = Pe(gri,j , g)
As proof for the correctness, follow the next equations for each advertisement.
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e(s4, g)
e(g1, g2)e(u0Pk2Gi,juk, s5), e(m0Pk2Gmmk, s2)
=
e(ga2(u
0Pk2Gi,juk)
ri,jgri,j(m0Pk2Gmmk)
q, g)
e(g1, g2)e(u0Pk2Gi,juk, g
ri,j), e(m0Pk2Gmmk, gq)
=
e(ga2 , g)e((u
0Pk2Gi,juk)
ri,j , g)e(gri,j , g)e((m0Pk2Gmmk)q, g)
e(g1, g2)e(u0Pk2Gi,juk, g
ri,j), e(m0Pk2Gmmk, gq)
=
e(g2, ga)e((u0Pk2Gi,juk), g
ri,j)e(gri,j , g)e((m0Pk2Gmmk), gq)
e(g1, g2)e(u0Pk2Gi,juk, g
ri,j), e(m0Pk2Gmmk, gq)
= e(gri,j , g)
5.5 Evaluation
Simulations show the timings of this scheme. Measurements are done on an Intel
Core i5-2500K@3.3GHz processor with 16 GB of memory using minGW on Win-
dows 7. The algorithm was implemented in C++ with the Pairing-Based Cryptog-
raphy library[10]. A bilinear map based on a supersingular elliptic curve Y2 =
X3 + X and a base field size of 512 bit is used.
The timings seen in table 5.1 are a result of the average of 10’000 runs.
TimeE 3.22350 + d’ * 3.72690
TimeS d’ * 3.91136
TimeD 3.24051 + dz * 6.43670
TimeV 3.24357 + d’ * 7.34714
Table 5.1: Computation times (in msec) of the new approach
d’ denotes the number of used attributes and dz the number of subscriptions for
the peer. I want to stress again, that the timings are no longer dependent on the
total number of attributes d, the system uses and it maybe d0  d.
5.6 Security
In this approach, a weaker notion of subscription confidentiality is provided as
in the original scheme, by clustering peers according to their subscriptions in a
hierarchical tree for each attribute. In case of k-subscriptions, each peer ensures,
that it has at least k subscriptions and for each of them a different parent (whenever
possible). Strong subscription confidentiality cannot be reached in this manner,
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because by design it is given, that parents know, that their children must have
a finer or equal subscription or even, unless one-hop flooding is used, know the
subscriptions of their children.
The scheme described in this chapter is used to provide event-confidentiality. An
identity-based signcryption scheme is used and extended with the advantages of
attribute-based encryption to be able to use only a subdimension for events and
subscriptions.
The identity based signcryption scheme [33] was already proved indistinguish-
able against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, evenwithout random oracles.Semantic
security is based on the hardness of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
and the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption was used to prove unforgeabil-
ity.
Key-policy attribute-based encryption was reduced to the hardness fo the Deci-
sional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
This is a solid basis for a new cryptosystem. In the encryption process not much
was changed. Adaptions were made to allow multiple dimensions. For the sig-
nature, the factor gri,j was added to the publisher’s private key Prpi,j[1]. Still, the
presence of the master public key ga2 prevents forgery.
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6.1 Summary
Aim of this thesis was to review [28], where mechanisms were introduced to pro-
vide authentication, publisher and subscriber confidentiality in broker-less content-
based publish / subscribe systems. Analyzing this approach especially with re-
spect to confidentiality and finding other shortcomings and solutions for these fol-
lowed.
To be able to understand the scheme, we first looked into some background.
Bilinear maps in the context of identity-based encryption were introduced. IBE
uses unique names for users as public keys for asymmetric encryption. Four steps
are necessary for communication: 1) Setup, where the key server determines and
calculates system parameters, keeps the master secret key private while publishing
the master public key, 2) key generation as soon as a peer contacts the peer server
and authenticates itself, a private key for this user is generated. As the public key
is a string, that can be easily obtained by any peer, no interaction with the key
server is necessary to write and encrypt a message as step 3). Lastly, step 4) is the
decryption of the message with the private key.
The approach itself proposes to cluster peers according to their subscriptions.
The event space is decomposed by creating dz-expressions. The subscriptions are
mapped to binary strings by continuous bisection. For each bisection one bit is ap-
pended to the dz-expression: “0” for the lower half, “1” for the upper one. Using
this technique, containment relationships can be determined easily by prefixmatch-
ing. For each attribute of the publish / subscribe system, the peers are structured in
hierarchical trees by the secure connection protocol. Parents always have coarser or
equal subscriptions than their children. As this exposes some information about the
subscriptions, strong subscription confidentiality cannot be provided. Therefore a
weaker notion of subscription confidentiality is introduced, which states, that only
containment relationships can be determined.
Having this topology, event dissemination is easy. The message is encrypted
for each dz-expression, that shall be able to decrypt, which yields a logarithmic
number of ciphertexts. A peer receiving these ciphertexts, tries to decrypt them
with the own private keys. If it is successful, one-hop flooding is used to deliver
the ciphertexts to the children, as their subscriptions shall be unknown.
This approach was implemented to run some simulations using PeerSim[12]. An
attack scenario explained who an attacker can break the confidentiality of the sys-
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tem. The scenario assumed to have access tomalicious nodes in the network, which
reveal their subscriptions and decrypted events. Now notifications can be traced
and by observing the network traffic, the attacker can tell, whether an event was
forwarded to the children, meaning, the event was decrypted, or not. Aggregating
the events that passed over a certain time may reveal the real subscription. The
simulation showed, that still only parts of the subscriptions can be determined. If
a peer is considered compromised only, if all of its subscriptions are known to the
attacker, confidentiality is even with a high number of 25% malicious nodes with
all links observable very good and only drops to about 93%. If one broken sub-
scription is enough to call a peer compromised, the figures do not look as good at
first glance. But further analysis shows, that only a small part of the subscriptions
are broken on each peer.
This supports the idea of “k-subscriptions”, which we initially came up with to
reduce false positives. In this mechanism, we ensure that each peer’s subscriptions
are divided into finer ones until there are at least k subscriptions on each tree. As
then not significantly more subscription parts are discovered, less information is
given away. This advance is used to drop one-hop flooding, as it reduces false pos-
itives by a great number. We let peers always know the exact subscription for the
connection of their children to be able to forward messages only to peers, that sub-
scribed for the event. The benefit is a reduction of false positives from about 25%
to only 2%. The remainder of false positives are inherent as a new event is always
sent to a random peer to preserve publisher confidentiality. As the figures show,
not too much confidentiality is lost and this mechanism can be well established.
Other drawbacks of the original approach are at first, that only subscriber keys
are bound together but not publisher keys and second that events and subscriptions
always need to specify all attribute, that exist in the network. As this can be a lot
more, than needed and still cryptographic operations need to be executed for all
of them, this means a great overhead. So a new method was proposed in chapter
5. Signcryption and attribute-based encryption were combined to cope with the
requirements. Again, this approach was implemented, this time using the Pairing-
Based Cryptographic Library PBC [10]. Results show reasonable timings for the
cryptographic operations. Moreover they are now only dependent on the number
of used attributes d’ instead of the whole attribute space d.
6.2 Future work
Four major issues were handled in this thesis: Analysis of confidentiality, reduction
of false positives, binding of publisher keys and the need to specify all attributes.
Still, as this field of work is quite young, it offers a lot of tasks more.
At first, it would be very interesting to look for techniques, that can provide
stronger subscription confidentiality. We have discussed earlier, that we will al-
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ways need a weaker subscription confidentiality, if we cluster peers. There might
be a different strategy to cluster peers without leaking so much information. Per-
haps a cryptofunction can be used to check, if two subscriptions are similar, without
letting any of the parties know anything. Subscribers could be sorted without con-
tainment relationships, then probably not in trees. Still, this could arise the need
for a new routing mechanism.
Another shortcoming so far is the need to decrypt messages before verifying
its signature. Suppose an unauthorized peer, that publishes a fake message. The
message is sent to a random peer initially. If it cannot decrypt the message, it will
forward it to its parent. This happens, as long, as no peer can decrypt the message,
in the worst case until the root. Only then it will be dropped, as the signature
won’t verify. Moreover, an attacker could follow this message to observe at which
peer it will be dropped. Then it can state, that non of the peers on the way were
able to decrypt. If an event could be verified before it is even decrypted, then fake
notifications could always be dropped on the first hop.
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